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Using the most recent estimates of agricultural price distortions, this chapter studies the 
economic, poverty, and income inequality impacts of both global and domestic trade 
reform in Argentina, with a special focus on export taxes. Argentina offers an interesting 
case study as the only large agricultural exporter that has, at many points in its history, 
applied export taxes to several of its agricultural products. The chapter combines results 
from a global economy-wide model (World Bank’s Linkage model), a national CGE 
model, and microsimulations. The results suggest that liberalization of world trade 
(including subsidies and import taxes, but not export taxes), both for agricultural and non-
agricultural goods, reduces poverty and inequality in Argentina. However, if only 
agricultural goods are included, indicators for poverty and inequality do not improve and 
even deteriorate somewhat. This is particularly the case if export taxes are eliminated. 
The chapter discusses the possible reasons for those results, offers some caveats, and 
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Using the most recent estimates of agricultural price distortions, this chapter studies the 
economic, poverty, and income inequality impacts of both global and domestic 
agricultural and total trade liberalization in Argentina, with a special focus on export 
taxes. Argentina offers an interesting case study because it is the only large agricultural 
exporter that at many times in its history has applied export taxes to several of its 
agricultural products. The most recent episode started after the large devaluation of early 
2002 when export taxes, which had been abolished during the 1990s, were reinstated and 
have been kept in place ever since.
1 
Export taxes have been defended by the Argentine government on the grounds 
that they are needed for reasons related to poverty alleviation, fiscal consolidation, and 
inter- and intra-sectoral balance of production, among others. Critics have argued that 
such taxes reduce growth and even increase poverty (see, for example, Nogués et al. 2007 
and Nogués 2008). This chapter looks at those conflicting claims using a general 
equilibrium approach, in an attempt to present a more integrated evaluation of those 
national measures. In doing so the chapter also examines the impact on Argentina of the 
rest of the world’s agricultural and trade policies, with a particular focus on the effects on 
poverty and inequality in Argentina.  
                                                 
1 Thus, this policy was unrelated to the sharp increase in world prices in 2007-08, when numerous 
agricultural-exporting developing countries introduced temporary export controls to reduce domestic food 
price increases.   2 
 
More specifically, the analysis combines results from a global economy-wide 
CGE model, a national CGE model, and microsimulations. The World Bank’s global 
Linkage Model (van der Mensbrugghe 2005) is used to analyze the impact on the 
Argentine economy of trade policy interventions by the rest of the world. That model 
uses the GTAP version 7 database which is calibrated to 2004 (Badri Narayanan and 
Walmsley 2008), except that the agricultural distortions in developing countries are taken 
from the new World Bank database as summarized by Valenzuela and Anderson (2008). 
The impacts on the terms of trade and export demand faced by Argentina of rest-of-world 
policies, which are simulated using the global Linkage model (see Anderson, Valenzuela 
and van der Mensbrugghe 2010), are transmitted as exogenous shocks to a national CGE 
model of Argentina. The results from the country CGE simulations – in terms of changes 
in employment, factor prices, and prices of goods and services – are linked to a 
microsimulation model for Argentina, which makes possible the analysis of the impact of 
these various changes on household poverty and inequality according to household 
survey data. The chapter analyzes and compares the effects on Argentina’s economy of 
removing rest-of-world distortions and Argentina’s own import tariffs and export taxes. 
In addition, the analysis distinguishes between agricultural reforms only, and those which 
include both agricultural and non-agricultural trade policies. 
The rest of the chapter is organized in four sections. The first section provides 
background information, including the economic context in which export taxes were 
implemented by Argentine authorities in response to the economic collapse of 2001-02, 
and the evolution of poverty and inequality indicators. The second section summarizes 
the methodology and data for both the national CGE and microsimulation models. This is 
followed by the core section that discusses the model simulations and results, while the 







In 2001-02, Argentina experienced one of the most severe crises in its history. Amid 
social unrest and street riots that led to more than 30 deaths and hundreds of injuries, the 
country plunged into a state of institutional disarray. GDP declined 10 percent in 2002, 
on top of the previous 3 consecutive years of decline that involved an accumulated GDP 
loss of another 10 percent. Formal unemployment jumped to more than 25 percent, and 
almost 60 percent of the population was considered to be below the national poverty line.  
The collapse was the result of a combination of factors. First and foremost, there 
were the policy rigidities of the Convertibility Plan, established in 1991 during the 
Menem Administration, which had linked the peso to the dollar in a (quasi) currency 
board arrangement at the exchange rate of 1 peso = 1 dollar. With inflation continuing at 
a high rate for about two years after fixing the exchange rate, the peso became 
overvalued, affecting the production of tradables. The fixed peg also forced Argentina to 
follow the US dollar appreciation that started in the mid-1990s, further punishing 
production, employment, and the fiscal accounts. Doubts about the sustainability of the 
peg also led to a generalized dollarization of the banking system, which eliminated the 
possibility of countercyclical monetary policy and increased the vulnerability of the 
domestic financial system to runs against the peso and/or the banks.  
Second, Menem’s government privatized a significant portion of the Social 
Security system by the mid-1990s, which generated a substantial transitional fiscal deficit 
that added to public indebtedness that was expected to take several decades to repay.
2  
Third, there was a sequence of negative exogenous shocks in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, including Brazil’s devaluation and the decline of agricultural prices. When 
the new government of President De la Rua took office in late 1999, the economy was 
already decelerating and heading into outright recession after that combination of external 
shocks.  
Fourth, the alliance of parties that constituted the De la Rua government (the first 
coalition government for many years) broke down under the economic strains of the 
deepening recession. In the second half of 2000, the Vice President resigned and its party 
                                                 
2 Recently, the Argentine Congress approved a law that changed the retirement system back to a pay-as-
you-go scheme, thus eliminating the middle-term transition deficit, but absorbing the longer term liabilities 
of the system,  4 
 
left the coalition, further weakening the capacity of the government to manage the 
difficult economic situation.   
At the end of 2001, with confidence waning, and a double run against the peso 
and the banking system, the situation was untenable. The administrative constraints 
imposed by the government on banking withdrawals to stop the run on the banks (which 
had basically dollarized deposits and therefore could not be helped by the Argentine 
Central Bank) finally led to widespread riots and the resignation of President De la Rua.  
A period of turmoil ensued, in which the country had four additional Presidents in just a 
few weeks through early 2002. 
By late 2001 and early 2002 it was clear that there were two separate but related 
fiscal and external problems of insolvency: a high public debt involving a non-
financeable fiscal deficit, and a high external debt (private and public) involving a non-
financeable current account deficit. The suspension of debt payments and the subsequent 
devaluation (abandoning the 1:1 peg to the US dollar) were desperate measures taken by 
the interim governments in early 2002 to try to cope with both problems. The exchange 
rate jumped to almost 4 pesos per 1 dollar (4:1) once it was allowed to float in the first 
half of 2002. It later declined to about 2.5:1 but by the end of 2008 the exchange rate was 
about 3.3:1.  
In the middle of a deep recession, aggravated by the banking crises and the 
devaluation, and needing to shore up fiscal accounts, the government in early 2002 
imposed export taxes on agricultural and several other products such as oil and other 
energy commodities. One of the objectives of those taxes was fiscal, in a moment when 
collection of more traditional income and value added taxes had dropped significantly 
due to the recession. Not only had tax receipts declined but the peso value of the public 
debt (most of it denominated in US dollars) had increased significantly with the 
devaluation. Under the 1:1 exchange rate, Argentina’s GDP was valued at almost 300 
billion dollars in the late 1990s, while the public debt was about 150 billion dollars (a 
ratio of debt/GDP of 50 percent). After the devaluation, the GDP was valued at less than 
100 billion dollars, but the debt, yet to be renegotiated, remained the same, implying an 
unsustainable debt/GDP ratio of more than 150 percent. Through the imposition of export 5 
 
taxes, the negative impacts of the devaluation on public accounts were partially 
compensated.  
Export taxes helped increase fiscal receipts by 1.5-2.5 percent of GDP (Figure 1). 
They were only one component in a more general effort to consolidate fiscal accounts 
through better collection of all taxes. Figure 2 shows that overall tax receipts increased by 
8-9 percent of GDP from 2002, compared with the 1990s, so export taxes accounted for 
less than one-third of the overall tax hike. There was also some adjustment in public 
expenditures, which during the period 2002-07 were about 0.8 percentage points of GDP 
below the average for the previous decade.  
  A separate and important objective of the government in imposing export taxes in 
the case of agricultural products (which include important food staples such as wheat, 
rice, beef, fruits and vegetables, and dairy products) was to moderate the upward impact 
of the devaluation on domestic food prices and thereby its impact on real wages and 
poverty. Very early in the development debate in Argentina it was argued that, since 
Argentina’s exports are mainly “wage goods” (in Ricardian terminology), a devaluation 
would put upward pressure on wages and affect the competitiveness of domestic industry 
(Díaz-Alejandro 1963, Braun and Joy 1967). By increasing domestic food prices, 
devaluations would raise the poverty line (which is based on prices of a basket of mainly 
food items) which, for a given income, would also increase the number of people under 
that adjusted poverty line. Export taxes were seen as a way to reduce that impact of the 
devaluation by moderating the increase in domestic food prices. 
The government has also maintained a moderate export tax differential (taxing 
somewhat more the primary products than the processed items), presumably to 
compensate domestic producers for the tariff escalation prevalent in the rest of the 
world.
3  
In addition, export taxes were imposed on other important export products such as 
oil and gas. That kept a lid on the domestic prices of energy, benefiting the different 
                                                 
3 Tariff escalation has been discussed at least since the Kennedy Round. The practice in high-income 
countries of imposing high import taxes on processed goods, and lower or no tariffs on primary products 
(thus granting a higher effective rate of protection to value added in the importing country), reduces 
significantly the processing capability of developing countries. This places agro-industrial production in 
developing countries at a disadvantage, tilting the export profile of developing countries towards raw 
materials (Balassa and Michalopoulos 1986, Díaz-Bonilla and Reca 2000).  6 
 
productive sectors in proportion to their use of energy inputs. This is important for 
agricultural production because it lowered farmers’ costs of fuel and fertilizers.  
Since 2003, and until about the end of 2008, the country has experienced a strong 
and rapid recovery, growing at about 8.5 percent during that period. That high growth 
was based to a large extent on the reduction of macro vulnerability and high volatility, 
which had been the main reason for Argentina’s dismal economic performance until 
recently.
4 The combination of a more realistic exchange rate (at approximately the real 
level – deflated by the US consumer price index – of the decades previous to the large 
overvaluation of the 1990s), fiscal consolidation (through increases in taxes and the debt 
renegotiation), and the accumulation of reserves in the Central Bank has reduced the 
main causes of macroeconomic vulnerability by sustaining surpluses in both fiscal and 
current accounts.
5 
  This period of economic growth led to improvements in employment, poverty, 
and income distribution, at least through late 2007. The fourth-quarter 2007 
unemployment rate of 7.5 percent was the lowest since the early 1990s, while during the 
2001-02 crisis it had topped 25 percent. The levels of poverty and extreme poverty 
declined from 58 percent and 28 percent, respectively, in 2002, to 23 percent and 8 
percent by the end of 2007. Income distribution also improved: the top-decile to bottom-
decile ratio declined from 32 at the beginning of 2004 to 26 in the first quarter of 2007.  
What has been the role of agricultural and other trade policies, particularly export 
taxes, in this performance? This is a policy question that can best be addressed using an 
empirical general equilibrium approach.  
Before going into that analysis, it is useful to look at the evolution of agricultural 
prices and production in Argentina since the imposition of export taxes in 2002. Critics of 
                                                 
4 During the last half century the country had been in recession about 40 percent of the time, due to 
recurrent macroeconomic crises linked to overvalued exchange rates and fiscal and current account deficits 
that led to the accumulation of public and external debts. 
5 The overall fiscal surplus for the consolidated public sector (central government and provinces) during 
2003-07 averaged 1.6 percent of GDP, compared to an average annual deficit of 4.2 percent of GDP during 
1961-2002. The surplus of the current account of the balance-of-payments in 2007 was 2.8 percent of GDP, 
while from 1976-2002 the country experienced an average annual deficit of 1.7 percent of GDP. The trade 
surplus for 2007 was more than 4 percent of GDP, against 1.4 percent during 1976-2002. Boosted by high 
commodity prices in international markets, exports in 2007 increased to about US$56 billion, nearly triple 
the 1990s average, while imports jumped to around US$43 billion, double the 1990s average. One of the 
consequences has been that Central Bank reserves exceeded US$50 billion by the end of the first quarter of 
2008, or 16 percent of GDP. 7 
 
this price-distorting policy argue that it reduces farmer incentives and adversely affects 
growth. The issue of farmer incentives, however, has to be analyzed in a broader policy 
context along with other measures, particularly the exchange rate.
6 Figure 3 shows that 
domestic producer prices in real terms
7 have been clearly above the 1990s values for a 
variety of farm products, suggesting that the negative impact of export taxes on domestic 
prices appears to have been more than offset by either the devaluation and/or a rise in 
international prices of farm products. Figure 4 shows another indicator of the incentives 
for agricultural production in Argentina, namely an index of domestic relative prices 
between the agricultural sector and the rest of the economy, along with an index of the 
real exchange rate in Argentina and an index of real international prices (see definitions 
in Figure 4). The significant improvement in the internal terms of trade for agriculture 
since 2002 was mainly caused by the adjustment in the real exchange rate, while only 
since the second half of 2007 do changes in world prices show a positive impact.
8,9 
In addition to the devaluation, there were other policies in Argentina that also 
benefited agriculture, such as normalization of the debt conditions for many producers 
affected by the 2001-02 macroeconomic collapse, lower energy prices through export 
taxes on those products (Argentina is a net exporter of energy), and the expansion of 
investments in technology and infrastructure. The combination of all those policies, plus 
rising international commodity prices, contributed to a strong supply-side response from 
farmers: Argentina’s production of grains and oilseeds during 2003-07 was about 10 
percent above the growth trend of the previous 45 years (see Appendix 1 for details).  
                                                 
6 After all, domestic producer prices (PD) result from the combination of export tax rates (TX), the nominal 
exchange rate (ER), world prices (PW) and marketing costs and margins (MCM): PD = PW*ER*(1-TX-
MCM). 
7Producer prices in pesos (as reported in FAOSTAT) deflated by the consumer price index (CPI) in 
Argentina. It should be noted that current controversies about the changes in the calculation of the 
Argentine CPI do not affect Figure 3, considering that the data reported in FAOSTAT currently ends in 
2006.   
8 This behavior of relative prices is different from the period before 2002 when the Convertibility Plan 
maintained a fixed 1 peso=1 US$ exchange rate, in which internal terms of trade for agriculture basically 
followed international prices downwards to the lows of 2001. Since this low point, real international 
agricultural prices recovered somewhat, improving significantly in the second half of  2007, and reaching 
by early 2008 levels about 60 percent above those in 2001; however, this only meant that they went back to 
the levels of the mid-1990s.    
9 There is a debate in Argentina as to what is the real level of inflation. The real exchange rate in Figure 4 is 
based on official statistics. However, even assuming that some of the more extreme estimates of inflation 
by private analysts are true, the real exchange rate would still be clearly above the level of 2001 by about 
60 percent, instead of around 80 percent using official data.       8 
 
While it is not evident from these recent data that export taxes are harming the 
agricultural sector, it could be argued that without export taxes agricultural growth rates 
would have been even higher. But it needs to be kept in mind that lower or no export 
taxes would have affected fiscal accounts and led to higher interest rates and possibly a 
weaker overall macroeconomic performance. Higher domestic prices may have led also 
to protests about domestic food prices, compromising social sustainability of the whole 
reform program. These possibilities are not explicitly explored in what follows. Rather, 
this chapter limits itself to disentangling the effects of agricultural and trade policies at 
home and abroad on poverty and income distribution in Argentina, with a special focus 
on export taxes.  
 
 
Methodology and data 
 
 
To explore the effects of agricultural and trade policies abroad on poverty and income 
distribution in Argentina, the approach is to use simulation results from the global 
Linkage model (see Anderson, Valenzuela and van der Mensbrugghe 2010) as exogenous 
shocks that are fed into a national computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for 
Argentina, and those results, in turn, are used as inputs in a microsimulation model. The 
latter two impacts are then compared with the impacts of own-country agricultural and 
trade policies estimated using only the national CGE and microsimulation models. There 
are no feedback effects from the micro to the macro level, but the microsimulations are 
consistent with the aggregates generated by the national CGE model. 
At the macro-level, the national CGE produces results for a given policy change 
including new levels of employment in each economic sector, new wages, and new 
relative prices. At the household level, the microsimulation model receives the changes in 
the macro-level variables and determines new individual wages and employment, a new 




CGE model for Argentina 
 
The national CGE model has similarities with Lofgren et al. (2002) and Lofgren and 
Diaz-Bonilla (2007). It is based on a 2005 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for 
Argentina with 24 activities and 26 commodities (Table 1). The disaggregation tries to 
match as closely as possible that of the global Linkage model. The national CGE model 
includes three institutions: a representative household, government, and rest of the world. 
There are 8 factors, including six labor categories: unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled 
men and women. Land and capital are considered partly sector specific and partly mobile 
across sectors. Land only moves within the primary agricultural sectors. The model and 
database consider several tax instruments including export taxes, income taxes, and the 
value added tax. The modeling of the value added tax incorporates rebates for 
intermediate inputs and investment purchases, so there is no cascading effect on prices of 
taxes on intermediate goods.  
While many CGE models are run under a full employment specification, here the 
modeling of the labor market allows for endogenous unemployment. This is described by 
a complementary-slackness condition for unemployment and wages. As the economy 
grows, if the factor market is below full employment then the unemployment rate is the 
clearing variable for the market; that is, unemployment decreases for the necessary labor 
types until a minimum unemployment rate is reached.
10 At full employment (i.e., when 
the minimum unemployment rate is reached), the economy-wide wage variable adjusts to 
clear the market.
11 
                                                 
10 The model was run with two definitions of full employment, i.e. the level of unemployment below which 
any additional labor demands result in increases in wages and not employment. Those values are 2.5 
percent and 5 percent. The results reported here correspond to the lower value of unemployment. The 
direction of the results does not differ much, although the employment multiplier effects are somewhat 
stronger under this (2.5 percent) than under the alternative (5 percent) definition of full employment.  
11 A reviewer argued that having employment as the adjustment variable is as “extreme” as the full 
employment assumption where wages adjust. The key point, however, is which labor closure better reflects 
the economic situation in Argentina, considering that in the base year unemployment was clearly above its 
frictional level. Also it must be noted that the complementary slackness condition allows the labor closure 
to switch towards wage adjustments once the frictional unemployment rate is reached. The model was also 
run with a full employment specification, and the results are qualitatively similar, with poverty being 
affected by lower salaries (instead of increases in unemployment) and higher food prices.  Still, the two 
labor market closures are not completely symmetrical, considering that the unemployment closure allows 
for larger changes in GDP. Finally, the model can also be run with a wage curve but the simulations, which 
do not differ much, are not shown here.  10 
 
Another modeling characteristic, resulting from the methodology of the World 
Bank project, is that the national model determines export supply behavior, but it takes 
rest-of-the-world demand changes from the global Linkage model, using an export 
demand curve based on parameters and results coming from that model (see Horridge and 
Zhai 2006). Therefore, we do not adopt the “small country” hypothesis on the export side. 
Regarding imports, however, the price shocks are taken directly from the global model, 
assuming that import supply functions for Argentina are flat (the small country 
assumption).  
The closures for the model are as follows. In the case of the government, it is 
assumed that both government consumption and savings are fixed in real terms. This 
means that the level of surplus (or deficit) in the base year is maintained (Argentina had a 
surplus in 2005), and that one or more taxes are the equilibrating variables. Here all tax 
rates are kept at the base year level, except for the rate of direct taxes, which adjusts to 
equilibrate fiscal accounts, compensating the revenue lost from trade liberalization. 
Therefore, the simulations are fiscally neutral. For the rest of the world, foreign savings 
(broadly defined to include other non-traded items) are fixed exogenously while the 
exchange rate adjusts. That is, the level of trade balance that existed in the base year is 
maintained in dollar terms, with the exchange rate acting as the equilibrating variable. For 
the savings-investment balance, investment is driven by savings as in the global Linkage 
model. Since both public and foreign savings are fixed, investment comes from changes 
in the savings behavior of households (specifically, the marginal propensity to 
save/consume adjusts). 
To better understand the effects of trade policy reforms it is helpful to be aware of 
the country’s trade structure and price distortions in the base year. The trade structure is 
summarized in Table 2: agricultural and agroindustrial products represent about 45 
percent of all exports, with petroleum and related products adding another 15 percent. 
Export and import taxes (or subsidies) are reported in Table 3 for 2005, the base year for 
the simulations. To put that data in historical context, Sturzenegger and Salazni (2008) 
show that the lowering of export taxes in the 1990s was reversed in the present decade 
such that farm prices for those products during 2000-05 were about one-sixth below 
international prices; meanwhile, nominal assistance rates for manufacturing, which were 11 
 





The results in terms of poverty and inequality at the micro level are calculated by linking 
the CGE model with a microsimulation model. The two are used in a sequential “top-
down” fashion: the CGE communicates with the microsimulation model by generating a 
vector of prices, wages, and aggregate employment variables such as labor demand by 
sector and the unemployment rate. The functioning of the labor market thus plays an 
important role, and the CGE determines the changes in employment by factor type and 
sector, and changes in factor and product prices that are then used for the 
microsimulations.  
 The Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH), the main household survey in 
Argentina, is used to build the microsimulation model. The EPH is carried out by the 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC 2006a). It covers 31 urban areas (all 
the urban areas with more than 100,000 inhabitants), which are home to 71 percent of the 
Argentine urban population. Since the share of urban areas in Argentina is 87 percent, the 
EPH sample represents around 62 percent of the total population of the country. The EPH 
gathers information on individual socio-demographic characteristics, employment status, 
hours of work, wages, family income, type of job, education, and migration status. There 
is no alternative source of household data to the EPH. No attempt was made to reconcile 
the household survey data with the national accounts. Instead, the results from the CGE 
are transmitted to the microsimulation model as percentage deviations from base values. 
The productive sectors in the EPH are divided into 10 categories (agriculture, mining, 
food/beverages/tobacco, textiles, petrochemicals, metals, machinery, vehicles, other 
manufactures, services) and the results from the CGE simulations are adjusted to the 
sectors of the EPH for the transmission of changes in the relevant variables.  
INDEC (2006b) calculates the basic food basket and the total basic consumption 
basket that determine the indigence (or extreme poverty) line and the (moderate) poverty 
line, respectively. An Engel coefficient captures the relationship between the extreme and 12 
 
moderate poverty lines calculated by the INDEC using the two baskets. Each CGE 
simulation generates a new level of economy-wide prices for commodities, which lead to 
changes in the cost of the basic food basket and therefore in the level of the extreme 
poverty line. The value for the new moderate poverty line is computed by assuming that 
the Engel coefficient remains constant. These changes in the poverty lines are captured in 
the last step of the microsimulations methodology (as explained below) and affect the 
final estimated poverty and indigence rates. 
We introduce the labor market results from the CGE model into the 
microsimulations in order to produce a counterfactual labor income for each individual in 
the household survey. We then recalculate household per capita income, and compute the 
new poverty and income inequality results. 
There are two broad approaches to capturing the labor market changes through 
microsimulations. In one case, the program selects at random (with multiple repetitions) 
from the corresponding labor groups the individuals who will change sectors and assigns 
wages to new workers according to parameters for the average groups. This approach is 
an extension of the earnings inequality methodology developed by Almeida dos Reis and 
Paes de Barros (1991).   
The second general approach is based on econometric techniques. In this 
approach, the movement of workers across sectors is determined by econometrically 
estimated probabilities in a sectoral choice model while the workers’ new wages are 
determined in an econometric model of wage earnings (see for example, Díaz-Bonilla 
2005 and Díaz-Bonilla et al. 2006). In both approaches, the new wage and employment 
levels for each individual result in new household per capita incomes that are then used to 
determine the new poverty and income distribution results.
12  
                                                 
12 The microsimulation model in Díaz-Bonilla (2005) and Díaz-Bonilla et al. (2006) has three main 
components: a sectoral choice model, a model of wage earnings, and a summation of the new wage and 
employment results for each household (from which follow the new poverty and income distribution 
results). Rather than random selection, the sectoral choice component is based on the estimation of a 
multinomial logit (MNL) model which determines a person’s probability, given certain characteristics, of 
working in each of the productive sectors, and therefore ranks who will move first into a growing sector. 
The second component of the econometric microsimulation model estimates a wage regression model that 
determines the labor income received by a new worker. If the macro model instead determines that 
employment should decrease in a given sector, then those with the lowest probability of working in that 
sector exit first and the new unemployed lose the wages they had.  13 
 
This chapter uses a combination of both approaches: the movement of workers 
across sectors is done by repeated sampling as in the first approach, while the assignment 
of wages depends on an econometrically estimated equation for the base year. Since the 
data do not record market wages for an individual who is not working, the human capital 
theory of Mincer (1962) leads to estimates of wages as a function of human capital 
variables (for example, experience and education). As in the second approach, a series of 
wage regressions estimates the sector-specific potential wage for each person according 
to his or her personal characteristics. 
The labor market variables and procedures that link the CGE model with the 
microsimulations are as follows. U in the tables with the microsimulations results refers 
to the impact of changes in the unemployment rate. This effect is simulated by changing 
the labor status of the active population in the EPH sample based on the results from the 
CGE model. For instance, if according to the CGE simulations unemployment decreases 
at the same time that employment increases for, say, semi-skilled men in sector A, the 
microsimulation program “hires” randomly from the EPH sample among the unemployed 
semi-skilled men. As explained above, individual incomes for the newly employed are 
assigned based on their characteristics (e.g., educational level) by using the coefficients 
of a Mincer equation estimated for those individuals employed in the base year. If the 
CGE simulations indicate a decrease in employment for a specific labor category and 
sector, the microsimulation program “fires” the equivalent percentage from the type of 
labor and sector, and the counterfactual income for those newly unemployed is zero. 
The impact of changes in the sectoral structure of employment is indicated as S in 
the tables below. This effect is simulated by changing the sectoral composition of 
employment. For those individuals that move from one sector to another, we simulate a 
counterfactual labor income based on their characteristics and on their new sector of 
employment, drawing on a Mincer equation estimated for the base year with sectoral 
dummies.   
The impact of changes in relative wages is indicated by W1. Wages in a sector are 
adjusted according to the changes from the CGE simulations but keeping the aggregate 
average wage for the economy constant. The impact of the change in the aggregate 
average wage for the economy, W2, is simulated by changing all labor incomes in all 14 
 
sectors, by the same proportion, based on the changes from the CGE simulations. Next, 
all the previous steps are repeated several times and averaged. 
Finally, PL is the impact of changes in the poverty line. The official extreme 
poverty (or indigence) line is recalculated for each scenario using the changes in the CGE 
simulations for the prices of the commodities used to compute the extreme poverty line in 
Argentina (only food items). Then the value for the official moderate poverty line is 





Model simulations and results 
 
 
This section describes the main simulations and presents first the overall economic 
effects of liberalization and then their impacts on poverty and inequality. Unless 
otherwise stated (for specific simulations), the closure rules for the government, rest of 




As with the other chapters in this volume, this case study is interested in better 
understanding the impact of agricultural and trade policies on poverty and inequality in 
Argentina. In the base year, no global or domestic liberalization is imposed, rather the 
model is calibrated to the actual situation of the country in 2005. A model scenario 
involving global liberalization of all goods markets can provide estimates of the bottom-
line impacts. On its own, however, such a simulation does not reveal the relative 
importance of various policies at home and abroad in generating that estimated impact. 
                                                 
13 We have also run the microsimulations with an additional effect resulting from other factor incomes 
(land and non-human capital), which we do not report here. The non-labor income data from the EPH is 
weak, and cannot be taken as appropriately representing the distribution of non-labor incomes and factors 
across households. In any case, given that the poor do not have much non-labor income, the introduction of 
this adjustment does not change the poverty impact, although it does have an impact on the income 
distribution results.  15 
 
Such differentiated analysis requires disaggregating the results in various ways. The 
contribution of agricultural reform alone is thus also analyzed separately, since in trade 
negotiations it is negotiated separately from other products. Currently, export taxes are 
not subject to negotiation in the WTO, so a reform to all goods, as well as to only 
agriculture, but without reforming export taxes, is also studied (the related simulations 
are labeled “WTO” only because of that fact and not because they represent the specific 
negotiating alternatives being discussed). Next, the chapter looks separately at rest-of-
world versus own-country policy reform, again with and without non-agricultural reform. 
Finally, since in Argentina’s case its agricultural (and mineral and energy) policies are 
dominated by export taxes, the chapter examines the effects of just removing unilaterally 
its export tax regime for all goods as well as for just farm products. In summary, a BASE 
scenario is calibrated for 2005 and the following ten simulations are then run: 
•  Sim 1, GLOB: removing all agricultural subsidies and all import and export taxes 
on goods trade in rest-of-world and Argentina; 
•  Sim 2, GLOBag: Same as Sim 1 except just agricultural reform (i.e., domestic, 
import and export taxes and subsidies removed only on agricultural products); 
•  Sim 3, WTO: Same as Sim 1 except not removing export taxes;  
•  Sim 4, WTOag: Same as Sim 3 except just agricultural reform; 
•  Sim 5, ROW: Same as Sim 1 except just in rest of the world, and because it does 
not include Argentina, export taxes in this country are operational in this 
simulation; 
•  Sim 6, ROWag: Same as Sim 5 except just agricultural reform; 
•  Sim 7, ARG: Same as Sim 1 except just in Argentina; 
•  Sim 8, ARGag: Same as Sim 7 except just agricultural reform; 
•  Sim 9, ARG-ex: Same as Sim 7 except only removing export taxes in all 
categories of goods and services, and again only in Argentina; 
•  Sim 10, ARGag-ex: Same as Sim 9 except just agricultural reform. 
  
Overall economic results 
 16 
 
To understand the poverty and income distribution results reported later, it is necessary to 
first take a look at the impact of the reforms on macroeconomic variables and factor 
markets. Various indicators are summarized in Table 4 for the baseline and for the ten 
scenarios outlined above. In particular it is important to look at the interaction of the 
changes in the poverty line and unemployment, as these can have opposing impacts on 
poverty.  
The results show a negative effect on the poverty line for all simulations (i.e., the 
poverty line increases relative to the base year, due to inflation of consumer prices). 
Under a scenario of global liberalization that removes all import and export taxes and 
agricultural subsidies (GLOB and GLOBag), the poverty line increases by more than 6 
percent over the base year. The poverty line impact is strongest for this simulation due to 
the combination of increases in the world prices of agricultural goods (from global 
liberalization) and the elimination of export taxes, which boost domestic food prices. 
Even though the real exchange rate (defined in the model as the price of tradables over 
non-tradables) declines strongly, this is not enough to compensate for the elimination of 
export taxes and, therefore, the domestic prices of food increase. On the other hand, the 
results show that the impact on the poverty line is smallest in those simulations where 
export taxes in Argentina are not eliminated (WTO, WTOag, ROW, and ROWag). 
The GLOB and GLOBag scenarios also both show negative impacts in terms of 
GDP, as do the scenarios of unilateral liberalization by Argentina (ARG, ARGag, ARG-
ex, ARGag-ex). The negative impact on GDP is stronger for the unilateral scenarios, but 
especially so when only export (not in combination with import) taxes are eliminated.
 14 
In addition, GDP decreases by 1.7 percent in the case of liberalization of all export taxes 
in Argentina (ARG-ex) and by 0.9 percent in the case of liberalization of only agricultural 
export taxes in the country (ARGag-ex). This is partly a result of the assumption that 
Argentina has some degree of monopoly power in its export markets, but also a 
consequence of our treatment of unemployment in the model. The scenarios without 
changes in export taxes, which do include the elimination of import taxes and rest of the 
                                                 
14 In the protection database used in the global model (and applied to the Argentina model), agricultural 
import tariffs for Argentina are negligible, and therefore results for the elimination of agricultural import 
taxes only are also small and are not reported. However, the direction of the results for the elimination of 
agricultural import taxes alone can be inferred by comparing the simulations where only export taxes are 
changed (ARGag-ex) with those where both export taxes and import tariffs are considered jointly (ARGag).  17 
 
world liberalization, all appear to increase GDP, particularly the two simulations with 
more traditional scenarios of national and world liberalization focusing on import taxes 
only (WTO and WTOag). In all cases, the impact of liberalization of all goods, rather 
than liberalization of only agricultural products, generates a larger GDP increase (or a 
smaller decrease where relevant). 
 In order to better understand the sectoral changes, Table 5 disaggregates GDP, 
exports, and imports into agricultural and non-agricultural groups,
15 and also presents the 
value of food consumption by households.   
The declines in GDP generated by the elimination of export taxes result from the 
negative impact on non-agricultural GDP outweighing the positive impact on agricultural 
value added following the change in relative prices. The shift of incentives towards 
agriculture affects production in other sectors through the usual general equilibrium effect 
of taking capital and labor (once the pool of employable but unemployed workers is 
exhausted) away from them. The largest positive impact on agriculture is when domestic 
prices are increased by both higher world prices from liberalization in the rest of the 
world and the elimination of export taxes. Likewise with agricultural and non-agricultural 
exports, the former expand and the latter decline except in the case when import tariffs 
are eliminated for all products (when non-agricultural exports also increase: simulations 
GLOB, WTO, and ARG). A consequence of this export orientation of agricultural 
products is that food consumption by households (bottom row in Table 5) declines in all 
scenarios when export taxes are eliminated. 
Table 4 also shows that unemployment increases in most of the simulations that 
include the elimination of export taxes, with the exception of the scenario (GLOB) that 
combines complete own liberalization (i.e. elimination of export and import taxes) with 
liberalization in the rest of the world for all products (but not when that scenario covers 
only agricultural products, GLOBag). The worst impact on employment comes from 
unilateral elimination of all export taxes in Argentina.   
                                                 
15 Agricultural activities, defined in the World Bank project, include agricultural and lightly processed food, 
excluding highly processed food, beverages and tobacco, which are GTAP sectors 25 (Food products nec) 
and 26 (Beverages and tobacco products).  In our model they correspond to the following sectors in Table 
4: 1. Cereals; 2. Vegetables and fruits; 3. Oil seeds; 4. Other crops; 5. Sugar cane and beet; 6. Livestock, 
milk and wool; 10. Meat; 11. Oils and fats; 12. Dairy products, and 13. Sugar. 18 
 
The negative impact on employment of eliminating export taxes appears more 
pronounced on unskilled and semiskilled labor, and more pronounced on female than on 
male workers. In general, these results are explained by the factor intensities of the 
sectors that expand and contract after a given policy change (see discussion below).  
On the other hand, both total world liberalization not including export taxes 
(WTO and WTOag) and total liberalization for the rest of the world (ROW and ROWag, 
which do not eliminate export taxes in Argentina) reduce unemployment (particularly the 
simulation WTO).  Liberalization in the rest of the world benefits more unskilled labor, 
and benefits male workers more than female workers.   
To understand the negative results on employment of eliminating export taxes, 
one needs to look at the sectoral composition of export taxes (Table 3) and the supply 
side response. In terms of sectoral composition, the largest export taxes are on grains, 
oilseeds, and oil. The elimination of these taxes increases the supply of primary product 
sectors that are less labor intensive than other activities, that supply inputs into other 
sectors, and for which the outward orientation of their sales increases significantly when 
export taxes are removed. The consequences of those three factors are less employment 
in general, through different and cumulative channels, discussed below.  
Without a full employment specification, the first characteristic (low labor 
intensity) leads to declines in employment directly. In the case of agriculture particularly, 
land is shifted from livestock, industrial crops, and other products that tend to be more 
labor intensive, to grains and oilseeds that are less so. This negative employment effect at 
the primary level is reinforced by the fact that, since the commodities from these sectors 
are inputs into other production activities,
16 the increase in prices also affects those other 
activities, which tend to shrink in production and employment because of higher input 
prices. Primary products that before were transformed locally are now exported as raw 
materials and the domestic industry declines. Oil in particular, once processed and 
refined, is an input to most other activities, which are negatively affected by higher oil 
prices. Finally, the outward orientation of the expanding activities appreciates the real 
                                                 
16 For instance, cereals and oilseeds are inputs to, among other sectors, flour mills, oilseed processors, beef 
and poultry producers and processors, bakeries, and so on; and-- oil is an input to the refining industry, 
transportation and a variety of energy and chemical industries that in turn are inputs to other downstream 
activities.   19 
 
exchange rate (see Table 4) which generates a form of “Dutch disease” for the rest of the 
tradables.   
Moving to the other simulations, the positive impact of liberalization in the rest of 
world both on GDP and employment is obvious: it creates more markets for Argentina’s 
exports, and with the specification of the labor market and the high unemployment that 
prevailed in the base year, the expansion in aggregate demand leads to more production 
and employment. In turn, the elimination of import taxes triggers a different mechanism: 
it leads to more imports that, because of the closure assumption of fixed foreign savings, 
also require more exports. Therefore, the real exchange rate depreciates, which increases 
the production of tradables and expands employment. In general, the elimination of 
import taxes increases imports and moderates the appreciation of the domestic currency 
in most simulations in which it happens, and, in the simulation “WTO” for all products, 
even leads to a small overall depreciation of the real exchange rate (Table 4).  
Note that the terms of trade tend to move against Argentina when export taxes are 
eliminated (Table 4). This is particularly the case when export taxes are eliminated 
unilaterally. As indicated, the specification followed in this project is to treat countries as 
having a degree of market power. Therefore, the elimination of export taxes depresses the 




Poverty and income distribution results 
 
The main results in terms of poverty are shown in Table 6, based on both the national 
extreme poverty (or indigence) line and the moderate poverty line. Table 7 presents the 
results of the Gini coefficient for household per capita income and also for labor income. 
Each of the simulation results shows the observed base-year poverty (or inequality) 
results in the first row, followed by the poverty and/or inequality results under each of the 
                                                 
17 We also ran the scenarios with exogenously fixed world prices (i.e. with the “small country” 
assumption). The effects on unemployment and poverty are comparable, in their direction and 
interpretation, with those presented here. A tentative conclusion, which may require further analysis, is that 
it is the structure of the economy, and the development pattern that ensues from the elimination of export 
taxes, which drives the poverty and income distribution results discussed here, and not necessarily the 
“large country” assumption.  20 
 
steps explained above in the microsimulation section. Therefore the second-to-last row 
shows the cumulative effect of all of the changes (U, S, W1, W2, and in the case of the 
poverty line, PL) on the poverty and inequality results. The last row shows the results in 
percent change from the observed base-year value. 
In terms of poverty, world trade liberalization (excluding export taxes; simulation 
WTO) for all goods diminishes both moderate and extreme poverty in Argentina. As 
indicated, there are two opposite effects at work, but here the end result is a reduction in 
poverty. On the one hand, the increase in the poverty line increases (Table 4) affects the 
poor negatively. This increase is also the result of opposing forces: although the 
elimination of import taxes lowers domestic prices, increases in world food prices and the 
devaluation of the domestic currency work in the opposite direction. The negative impact 
of a higher poverty line, however, is more than compensated by a strong employment 
effect: Table 4 shows that the “WTO” trade scenario is the one that generates the largest 
decline in unemployment (2.6 percentage points). Therefore, poverty declines in this 
trade liberalization scenario. The same scenario of liberalization but only for agriculture, 
however, does not reduce poverty: the employment effect is far weaker, and is more than 
offset by the negative impact on poverty of the increase in the poverty line.  
Liberalization in the rest of the world (ROW and ROWag) initially reduces 
poverty slightly through the employment effect, but then this is more than compensated 
by the increase in the poverty line (due to higher world food prices), resulting in a small 
increase in poverty overall (it is worse when only agriculture is liberalized, ROWag).
18 
This suggests that the positive impact on poverty from the simulation that includes both 
the rest of the world and Argentina (WTO) is driven in good measure by domestic, and 
not international, liberalization in nonagricultural goods.  
If both own liberalization (exports and imports) and liberalization in the rest of the 
world are considered (GLOB and GLOBag), poverty increases. In the case of 
liberalization of all products (GLOB), there is a positive employment effect on poverty 
(but not when only agricultural products are considered) that, again, is more than 
compensated by the increase in the poverty line.   
                                                 
18 In any case, given that, other than export taxes, Argentina does not have agriculture-related policies that 
are changed, the results of the simulations WTOag and ROWag are basically the same. 21 
 
The main difference in policies in the scenarios GLOB and GLOBag compared to 
WTO and ROW is that now export taxes in Argentina are also eliminated. In fact, all 
simulations that include their elimination, either on all goods or only for agriculture, 
show an increase in the poverty headcount. Particularly negative for the poverty 
headcount is the unilateral elimination of export taxes by Argentina. The first negative 
impact comes from the unemployment effect, which, as indicated before, results from a 
combination of moving from the production of greater value added goods to primary 
products that are less labor intensive, and a form of “Dutch Disease” on the non-
agricultural sectors. A second and additional negative effect, which is generally stronger 
in the simulations than the unemployment effect, results from the increase in the poverty 
line due to higher food prices (see the line “U + S + W1 + W2 + PL” in all poverty 
simulations). In general, the sectoral and wage effects do not make much of a difference 
in poverty terms.     
Table 7 shows the results on income distribution. Simulations that include the 
elimination of export taxes increase income disparities slightly, both at the household 
level and considering only employed labor incomes. On the other hand, liberalization in 
the rest of the world and Argentina without changing export taxes (WTO and WTOag), 
and liberalization only in the rest of the world (ROW), produce small but positive effects, 
reducing inequality. Land receives important increments in factor incomes (not shown 
here) in all simulations involving the elimination of export taxes, which should increase 
income inequality (see footnote 13 above).  
At least within the context of a static framework, the simulation results suggest 
that export taxes help to reduce poverty and inequality, generate additional employment 
opportunities that the production and exports of raw materials would not have provided, 
and help to support a more competitive exchange rate. Also, the simulations imply that 
(under the “large country” assumption) the elimination of export taxes negatively affects 
the country’s terms of trade.
19 
                                                 
19 We also ran an “optimal trade tax simulation,” based on the notion that if a country has market power 
internationally, there must be a positive trade tax rate that maximizes some indicator of welfare for that 
country. Based on real GDP, the rates in the base year should be increased by about 80 percent, which 
would mean that, just giving some examples, the export tax rate for cereals should go from 24 percent to 43 
percent, oilseeds from 29 percent to 52 percent, and oil products from 20 percent to 36 percent. If the 
objective is to maximize employment, export taxes should be somewhat larger than in the case of GDP 22 
 
The simulations reported here differ from the results in Nogués et al. (2007) and 
Nogués (2008), who argue that poverty increases with the export taxes. The discrepancies 
in results are the consequence of the differences in methodological framework (see the 
discussion in Appendix 2).  
 
Fiscal and growth implications 
 
Two other important issues that the simulations raise are the fiscal and growth effects of 
the different liberalization scenarios. Regarding fiscal accounts, our model is run with a 
balanced budget, with increases in direct tax rates compensating for any change in trade 
tax revenues. Table 8(a) shows the collection of different taxes as a percentage of GDP in 
the various scenarios, focusing on trade and direct (income) taxes. The scenarios with the 
elimination of only agricultural export taxes still collect some export tax revenue from 
other products (about 0.5 percent of GDP, mainly from oil and energy commodities). The 
increase in direct taxes needed to close the fiscal gap is somewhat more than the direct 
revenues lost (2.2 percent of GDP) because government consumption is fixed in real 
terms which means that the nominal cost of running the government, and therefore the 
potential need to collect additional taxes, also changes with the simulations. Also, 
because GDP declines, taxes as a percentage of GDP increase somewhat (and vice-versa 
in the scenarios where GDP increases).
20       
It has also been suggested that, in order to counter the poverty effects of the 
export taxes, VAT taxes could be reduced to compensate the poor for higher food prices. 
In addition, it has been argued that more targeted safety nets, such as conditional cash 
transfers (like the “Familias” program in Argentina), or food stamps of some sort, could 
be utilized to counter the negative impacts on poverty of eliminating export taxes. 
                                                                                                                                                   
maximization. These numbers must be viewed with extreme caution, however, because of the uncertainties 
about the shape of the demand curves assumed in the World Bank global model. Further work needs to be 
done on the impact of the large country assumption, which may be forcing a more extreme agricultural 
specialization than is warranted.  
20 This result is in contrast to that estimated by Nogués et al. (2007), who claim that a non-trivial portion of 
those revenues can be recovered by maintaining the rates of other taxes at their baseline level. Their partial 
equilibrium analysis still estimates a net loss of fiscal revenues, but a far smaller one than that suggested by 
the above simulations using a general equilibrium model. Given the high debt-to-GDP ratio and public debt 
payments in Argentina, the negative macroeconomic effects of a drop in tax revenues could be 
considerable. 23 
 
However, both suggestions would entail even larger fiscal revenue losses, with their 
negative macroeconomic implications. Moreover, while those remedies would address 
the poverty line (PL) part of the poverty impact, they would not solve the employment 
issue (U). Another alternative, involving raising the indirect (VAT) tax rate (perhaps just 
on non-food items so as not to hurt the poor), again may adversely affect employment.  
Another important issue is the growth effects of export taxes. It could be argued 
that, even if the actual effects are as reported here in the short term, in the medium to 
longer term the elimination of export taxes could generate stronger growth that may more 
than compensate for the immediate negative impact on employment, the poverty line and 
inequality. The simulations presented here can give some indication of the dynamics 
going forward, via the change in real investment in the different simulations relative to 
the base year (Table 8(b)). The simulations with the unilateral elimination of export taxes 
alone (ARG-ex and ARGag-ex) do increase real investment. Even though the increase is 
less than 1 percent, that would accumulate over time and could turn out to be significant. 
A counter-argument is that a more-diversified productive structure, with investments 
flowing to non-agricultural sectors, may have a better payoff in terms of higher economic 
growth and less poverty and inequality. Those are all legitimate claims worthy of 
empirical analysis,
21 and raise the question as to what type of development path would be 
more pro-poor in Argentina. Given this country’s agrarian structure, with a bigger 
presence of large holdings than in many other developing countries, this issue has long 
been a matter of policy debate in the country, recognizing that export taxes generate a 
more diversified economic structure and that their elimination may undermine that goal. 
 
 
Final comments  
   
This chapter has analyzed several scenarios involving trade liberalization at home 
and abroad, both for all products and only for agriculture, and has estimated their impacts 
on poverty and inequality in Argentina. Global trade liberalization for all products but not 
                                                 
21 Gómez Galvarriato and Williamson (2008) and Williamson (2008) provide historical perspectives on the 
wisdom of countries exploiting the positive terms of trade in primary products and further specializing in 
those products versus maintaining a more diversified structure.  24 
 
including an elimination of export taxes (scenario WTO) reduces poverty and inequality. 
This result is due to strong employment effects that are not negated by the increases in 
the poverty line which take place. However, if the same liberalization scenario applies 
only to agricultural products, poverty and inequality do not improve, and even deteriorate 
somewhat, mostly because the smaller (but still positive) employment effect is now more 
than offset by the increase in the poverty line. All other simulations, particularly those 
that eliminate export taxes, affect poverty and inequality more negatively, not only 
because the poverty line increases with higher food prices but also because employment 
effects are small or negative.    
Should one then conclude that export taxes, particularly in agricultural products, 
are always good for poverty reduction? Such a conclusion would be premature. First, any 
statements in this regard must be tempered by the fact that the coverage of the EPH 
household survey is tilted towards Argentina’s urban locations. Although the results from 
the CGE model, which obviously includes all sectors and population, show declines in 
overall employment and increases in the value of the poverty line (all negative effects for 
the poor), it is not possible to glean from these results what may happen if the rural 
population not covered in the survey were to be included. Second, the simulations do not 
say anything about the impact on the rest of the world of higher agricultural prices, and 
the impact on poverty outside Argentina resulting from export taxes.
22 Third, the model 
used in this chapter has other limitations, particularly the fact that it does not include the 
medium- to long-term dynamic effects on production and technological innovation that 
may result from policy reforms. Clearly there remains plenty of scope for further 





                                                 
22  It should be noted that in the case of Argentina, the devaluation and normalization of the real exchange 
rate in line with this country’s history, even though compensated in part by export taxes, has delivered a 
strong production and export response, as argued above and in Appendix 1. Other things equal, the result of 
all policy reforms followed in Argentina this decade (notwithstanding the inclusion of new export taxes) 
should have reduced upward pressures on agricultural prices in international markets.  25 
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Figure 1: Export taxes, Argentina, 2001 to 2007  
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Source: Ministry of Economy (2008). 
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Figure 2: Tax revenue, Argentina, 1991 to 2007   
 































Figure 3: Agricultural producer prices indices, Argentina, 1992 to 2006   
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Source: FAOSTAT (2008) and Ministry of the Economy (2008). 31 
 
Figure 4: Indices
a of the international price of agricultural products,
b relative domestic 
price of agricultural products,
c and the real effective exchange rate,
d Argentina, 1996 to 
2008  



































REER index (CPI based; against US$) Relative prices agriculture/non agriculture
World Agricultural Prices (Real; deflated by CPI-US)
 
 
a All variables are normalized to 1 for the first quarter of 2001.  
b An index of real prices for world agricultural prices (the weighted average of IMF 
indices for “Food,” “Beverages” and “Agricultural Raw Materials,” using IMF weights, 
deflated by the US Consumer Price Index). 
c An index of domestic relative prices between the agricultural sector and total GDP 
(measured as the ratio of the deflator of agricultural value added in GDP at factor cost to 
the total GDP deflator at factor cost). 
d An index of the real effective exchange rate (REER) of the Argentine peso against the 
US dollar, calculated using the average nominal exchange rate (pesos per US dollar), and 
the consumer prices indices of Argentina and the US.  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Ministry of the Economy (2008).   32 
 
Table 1: Components of the social accounting matrix, Argentina, 2005  
 
Sectors (26)     Sectors (26) -- (cont)    Institutions (3) 
Primary   Other  manufactures    Household 
1  Cereals   18 Textiles and apparel  Government 
2  Vegetable and fruits   19 Petroleum refinery  Rest of World 
3  Oil seeds   20 Chemical products   
4  Other crops   21 Mineral products  Taxes (9) 
5  Sugar cane and beet   22 Metal products  Value added tax 
6  Livestock, milk and wool   23 Machinery and equipment  Fuel tax 
7  Other non-agr primary   24 Vehicles  Financial services tax 
8  Mining   25 Other manufacturing  Export taxes 
9 Oil    26 Services  Tariffs 
          Turnover  tax   
Processed food    Factors (7)    Taxes on products 
10  Meat   Unskilled labor, male    Income tax 
11  Oils and fats   Unskilled labor, female    Factor tax 
12  Dairy products   Semi-skilled labor, male     
13  Sugar   Semi-skilled labor, female    Savings-Investment (1) 
14  Flour, bakery and pasta   Skilled labor, male    Savings-Investment 
15  Feed products   Skilled labor, female     
16  Other proc food   Capital, specific and mobile     
17  Beverages and tobacco   Land, mobile bt agric sectors      
 

























     
Primary        
Cereals 5.9 0.0 55.0  0.4
Vegetable and fruits  2.3 0.3 29.5  4.6
Oil seeds  4.8 0.5 30.9  3.8
Other crops  0.8 0.4 9.9  4.8
Sugar cane and beet  n/a n/a n/a  n/a
Livestock, milk and wool  0.5 0.1 1.8  0.2
Other non-agr primary  0.2 0.2 8.4  9.1
Mining 3.4 2.9 29.2  23.7
Oil 5.8 0.7 25.3  3.7
Processed food         
Meat 4.1 0.2 19.0  1.0
Oils and fats  16.3 0.1 86.8  4.0
Dairy products  1.5 0.1 13.7  0.6
Sugar 0.3 n/a 19.5  n/a
Flour, baking and pasta  0.7 0.1 4.1  0.7
Feed products  0.1 0.1 7.7  3.9
Other processed food  4.6 1.2 31.6  9.5
Beverages and tobacco  1.2 0.2 7.7  1.0
Other manufactures         
Textiles and apparel  3.7 4.2 18.5  18.5
Petroleum refinery  8.7 2.6 39.4  14.6
Chemical products  9.2 19.4 26.8  40.4
Mineral products  0.5 1.0 6.2  10.2
Metal products  7.2 7.1 21.5  19.4
Machinery and equipment  4.3 33.6 19.6  62.8
Vehicles 8.1 15.9 42.4  56.0
Other manufacturing  5.9 9.2 14.2  18.4
Total 100.0 100.0 11.8  10.8
 
Source: Argentina 2005 SAM prepared by the authors.  
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Import taxes  Export taxes 
  
Primary    
Cereals 0.0  24.0 
Vegetable and fruits  0.0  7.0 
Oil seeds  0.0  29.0 
Other crops  0.0  6.6 
Sugar cane and beet  0.0  0.0 
Livestock, milk and wool  0.0  7.8 
Other non-agr primary  1.0  0.9 
Mining 1.0  0.9 
Oil 1.0  30.0 
Processed food     
Meat 0.0  4.4 
Oils and fats  0.0  20.0 
Dairy products  0.0  5.0 
Sugar 0.0  2.0 
Flour, bakery and pasta  9.7  0.0 
Feed products  6.4  0.0 
Other proc food  7.7  0.0 
Beverages and tobacco  11.7  0.0 
Other manufactures     
Textiles and apparel  13.2  0.3 
Petroleum refinery  0.9  0.9 
Chemical products  7.6  0.9 
Mineral products  8.1  0.9 
Metal products  10.0  0.9 
Machinery and equipment  11.1  0.9 
Vehicles 13.8  0.9 
Other manufacturing  10.4  0.9 
 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) for export taxes, Argentina’s SAM 2005 
prepared by the authors for import tariffs. 35 
 
Table 4: Aggregate simulation results for Argentina of prospective liberalizations  
 
  







GDP factor cost (bn LCU) 
a  4,395  -0.2 -0.8 1.5 0.2 0.3 0.2 -0.4  -0.9 -1.7 -0.9
Household consumption (bn 
LCU) 
a  3,263  0.5 0.0 2.1 0.9 1.0 0.9 -0.5  -0.8 -1.7 -0.8
Poverty line 
a  --  6.3 6.0 2.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 4.9  4.8 4.1 4.8
Real exchange rate 
a  1.0  -4.6 -6.3 0.5 -2.9 -2.0 -2.9 -2.7  -3.5 -5.3 -3.5
Terms of trade 
a  --  0.1 1.6 1.0 2.0 2.3 2.0 -2.2  -0.6 -1.3 -0.6
Unemployment rate (%) 
b  12.3  -0.4 0.8 -2.6 -0.4 -0.6 -0.4 0.1  1.1 2.4 1.1
Unskilled labor, female  29.4  -0.4 0.7 -2.4 -0.3 -0.6 -0.3 0.1  0.9 1.9 0.9
Semi-skilled labor, female  18.8  0.1 1.0 -2.4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 0.4  1.1 2.4 1.1
Skilled labor, female  5.1  -0.4 1.0 -2.6 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1  1.1 2.4 1.1
Unskilled labor, male  14.3  -0.4 0.6 -3.0 -0.6 -0.8 -0.6 0.2  1.1 2.5 1.1
Semi-skilled labor, male  9.4  0.0 1.0 -2.8 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 0.4  1.3 2.8 1.3
Skilled labor, male  4.1  -1.1 0.5 -1.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.7  0.9 2.0 0.9
Returns to factors 
a                      
Unskilled labor, female  --  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0
Semi-skilled labor, female  --  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0
Skilled labor, female  --  0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0
Unskilled labor, male  --  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0
Semi-skilled labor, male  --  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0
Skilled labor, male  --  0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0
Land  --  62.4 59.3 20.6 12.1 12.9 12.1 46.2  44.6 37.3 44.6
Capital, specific agric  --  79.1 76.3 18.4 10.7 11.2 10.7 63.8  62.2 53.9 62.2
Capital, specific non-agric  --  2.6 -3.1 1.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.7 3.5 -2.4 0.9 -2.4
Capital, mobile  --  5.4 1.4 2.7 0.1 0.2 0.1 5.1  1.2 2.4 1.2
 
a Percentage change from base 
 
b Percentage points difference from base 
 
Source: Authors’ Argentine CGE model simulations. 36 
 
Table 5: Sectoral simulation results for Argentina of prospective liberalizations 
 
(percent change from base) 
 
   BASE
(billion LCU) GLOB GLOBag WTO WTOag ROW ROWag ARG ARGag ARG-
ex 
GDP, agriculture  434 16.5 16.1 9.6 6.6  6.8  6.6 10.4 10.4 8.0
GDP,non-agriculture 3,961 -2.0 -2.7 0.6 -0.5  -0.4  -0.5 -1.6 -2.1 -2.8
Exports, agriculture  470 44.0 43.8 15.3 11.4  10.9  11.4 34.4 34.6 30.4
Imports, agriculture  15 113.5 104.2 0.2 -3.0  1.0  -3.0 115.5 116.5 113.0
Exports, non-agriculture  894 0.6 -17.1 4.5 -7.1  -6.7  -7.1 7.4 -10.6 -4.0
Imports, non-agriculture  1,025 19.4 6.3 12.6 2.2  2.3  2.2 17.1 3.9 7.0
Food consumption (households)  641 -0.7 -1.1 1.5 0.6  0.7  0.6 -1.3 -1.6 -2.3
 
Source: Authors’ Argentine CGE model simulations. 
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(a) Official extreme poverty line        
Effect BASE  GLOB GLOBag WTO WTOag ROW  ROWag  ARG ARGag ARG
Observed  12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7
U  12.7 12.6 13.0 11.9 12.6 12.5 12.6 12.7 13.1
U + S  12.7 12.6 13.0 11.9 12.6 12.5 12.6 12.7 13.1
U + S + W1  12.7 12.6 13.0 11.9 12.6 12.5 12.6 12.7 13.1
U + S + W1 + 
W2  12.7 12.6 13.0 11.9 12.6 12.5 12.6 12.7 13.1
U + S + W1 + 
W2 + PL  12.7  13.7 14.2 12.2 12.8 12.7 12.8 13.6 14.0
change from 
base     8.5% 11.8% -3.4% 1.1% 0.6% 1.1% 7.5% 10.9% 14
      
(b) Official moderate poverty line                     
Effect BASE  GLOB GLOBag WTO WTOag ROW  ROWag  ARG ARGag ARG
Observed  34.2 34.2 34.2 34.2 34.2 34.2 34.2 34.2 34.2
U  34.2 34.1 34.7 33.0 34.1 34.0 34.1 34.3 34.8
U + S  34.2 34.1 34.8 33.1 34.1 34.0 34.1 34.3 34.8
U + S + W1  34.2 34.1 34.8 33.1 34.1 34.0 34.1 34.3 34.8
U + S + W1 + 
W2  34.2 34.1 34.8 33.1 34.1 34.0 34.1 34.3 34.8
U + S + W1 + 
W2 + PL  34.2  36.5 37.1 33.8 34.5 34.5 34.5 36.2 36.7
change from 
base     6.6% 8.5% -1.3% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 5.7% 7.3% 8
 
aThe net impact is the sum of the impacts of changes in 5 variables, where U refers to 
those due to the unemployment rate changing, S to changes in the sectoral structure of 
employment, W1 to changes in relative wages, W2 to changes in the aggregate average 
wage for the economy, and PL to changes in the poverty line. 
 
Source: Authors’ Argentine CGE model simulations. 
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(a) Household per capita income                         




Observed 0.499  0.499  0.499 0.499 0.499 0.499 0.499  0.499  0.499 0.499 0.499
U 0.499  0.499  0.500 0.495 0.498 0.498 0.498  0.499  0.500 0.502 0.500
U + S  0.499  0.499  0.500 0.495 0.498 0.498 0.498  0.499  0.500 0.502 0.500
U + S + W1  0.499  0.499  0.500 0.495 0.498 0.498 0.498  0.499  0.500 0.502 0.500
U + S + W1 + 
W2  0.499 0.499  0.500 0.495 0.498 0.498 0.498 0.499  0.500 0.502 0.500
change from 
base     0.00%  0.20% -0.70% -0.10% -0.20% -0.10%  0.10%  0.30% 0.60% 0.30%
                  
(b) Employed labor income 
                             




Observed 0.472  0.472  0.472 0.472 0.472 0.472 0.472  0.472  0.472 0.472 0.472
U 0.472  0.472  0.472 0.471 0.472 0.472 0.472  0.472  0.472 0.473 0.472
U + S  0.472  0.472  0.472 0.471 0.472 0.472 0.472  0.472  0.472 0.473 0.472
U + S + W1  0.472  0.472  0.472 0.471 0.472 0.472 0.472  0.472  0.472 0.473 0.472
U + S + W1 + 
W2  0.472 0.472  0.472 0.471 0.472 0.472 0.472 0.472  0.472 0.473 0.472
change from 
base     0.00%  0.10% -0.20% 0.00% -0.10% 0.00%  0.10%  0.10% 0.30% 0.10%
 
aThe net impact is the sum of the impacts of changes in 5 variables, where U refers to 
those due to the unemployment rate changing, S to changes in the sectoral structure of 
employment, W1 to changes in relative wages, W2 to changes in the aggregate average 
wage for the economy, and PL to changes in the poverty line. 
 
Source: Authors’ Argentine CGE model simulations. 
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Table 8: Fiscal and real investment effects for Argentina of prospective liberalizations 
 
(a) Trade and income taxes (% of GDP)
a 
 




Import tax  1.5  0.0 1.5 0.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.0  1.5  1.6 1.5
Export tax  2.2  0.0 0.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 0.0  0.5  0.0 0.5
Direct (income) tax  7.5  11.2 9.2 8.4 7.3 7.2 7.3 11.3  9.3  10.1 9.3
        
 
(b) Real investment 
 





level and change 
from base 
 
1,114  4.2 2.4 3.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.6  0.8  0.6 0.8
As % of GDP at 
market prices  20.8  21.4 21.3 21.2 21.1 21.0 21.1 21.1  21.0  21.0 21.0
 
 
a The total tax revenue is kept constant at 29 percent of GDP. 
 




Appendix 1: Argentine recent agricultural production growth  
 
Since 2003 the volume of crop production in Argentina has jumped significantly above 
trend, which itself has been accelerating. Compared to the (exponential) trend shown in 
Appendix Figure A.1, Argentina’s production of grains and oilseeds during 2003-2007 
has been about 10 percent above that trend, for an accumulation of almost 40 million 
metric tons (MT) of excess production during that period that would not have been 
available had Argentina stayed on trend.  
 
Appendix Figure A.1: Grain and oilseed production, Argentina, 1960 to 2008 



































Source: USDA (2008). 
 
Appendix Table A.1 presents a more disaggregated view for grains, oilseeds and 
byproducts, and beef. For each product the following five variables are shown: national 
production and exports, Argentina’s share of world production and of world exports, and 
the share of Argentina’s production that is exported (Argentina’s imports of those 
products are negligible.) The main comparison is between the period 2003-07 and the 
1990s. The period of the crisis, 1999-2002, is also included as a reference because, 41 
 
usually, food exports tend to expand during economic crises mainly due to declines in 
domestic consumption. The data comes from the PSD database of the USDA (2008).  
It is clear that the physical volume of production and exports increased noticeably 
during the period 2003-07 across all products shown, when compared to the 1990s or 
with the crisis period 1999-2002. How does that supply and export response compare to 
the world as a whole? The next two variables, which include Argentina’s production and 
exports as a percentage of the respective world values, show that, in general, the 
participation of Argentina in the rest of the world also went up in 2003-2007. If the main 
reason for Argentina’s increases in production were world prices, but this incentive effect 
was muted by export taxes, Argentina should have decreased its global participation, and 
not increased it, other things equal. This last effect is in line with the strong shift in 
domestic incentives shown in Figures 4 and 5 as a result of normalizing the real exchange 
rate up to Argentina’s historical levels of 1975-1990, before the Convertibility program 
engineered a sustained overvaluation of the Argentine currency.  
The last variable in Appendix Table A.1 shows that Argentina, on average and for 
most products, has been selling to the rest of the world a larger percentage of production. 
Even though there has been some rebalance in the last two years shown for animal 
products, the export orientation is stronger than in the past.   42 
 



















a       
Production (1000 MT)  29,166 35,498 38,335 38,958 43,429 
Total Exports (1000 MT)  16,404 21,845 24,065 23,915 27,764 
Production Argentina/World  1.6% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 2.2% 
Exports Argentina/World  7.4% 9.3% 9.7% 9.3% 10.7% 
Exports/Production Argentina  55.0% 61.4% 62.5% 61.1% 63.9% 
BEEF   
Production (1000 MT CWE)  2,657 2,765 3,086 3,150 3,200 
Total Exports (1000 MT 
CWE)  393 306 567 542 532 
Production Argentina/World  5.2% 5.1% 5.3% 5.3% 5.3% 
Exports Argentina/World  6.6% 5.1% 8.0% 7.2% 7.0% 
Exports/Production Argentina  14.8% 11.0% 18.3% 17.2% 16.6% 
OILSEED MEALS   
Production (1000 MT)  10,639 17,123 24,531 26,986 27,364 
Total Exports (1000 MT)  10,117 16,838 23,385 25,809 26,442 
Production Argentina/World  10.7% 13.2% 16.0% 16.7% 16.5% 
Exports Argentina/World  31.4% 41.1% 44.4% 45.9% 45.9% 
Exports/Production Argentina  94.9% 98.3% 95.3% 95.6% 96.6% 
OILSEED OILS         
Production (1000 MT)  3,770 5,141 6,960 7,593 7,637 
Total Exports (1000 MT)  3,119 4,519 6,206 6,824 6,830 
Production Argentina/World  13.1% 14.3% 16.0% 16.5% 16.2% 
Exports Argentina/World  40.0% 45.4% 48.2% 48.4% 47.0% 
Exports/Production Argentina  81.8% 88.1% 89.1% 89.9% 89.4% 
OILSEEDS   
Production (1000 MT)  19,393 32,774 43,860 48,300 52,300 
Total Exports (1000 MT)  3,272 6,721 8,338 8,446 9,597 
Production Argentina/World  12.3% 16.0% 18.0% 18.6% 19.5% 
Exports Argentina/World  9.5% 12.0% 12.6% 12.2% 13.2% 
Exports/Production Argentina  17.4% 20.3% 19.1% 17.4% 18.3% 
a. Grains (wheat, corn, rice, sorghum, oats, rye, barley, millet).     
 
Source: USDA (2008).  43 
 
Appendix 2: Comparison with trade policy analysis by Nogués et al. (2007) and 
Nogués (2008) 
 
While this paper follows a general equilibrium approach, Nogués et al. (2007) and 
Nogués (2008) use two separate partial equilibrium methodologies that they characterize 
as a macro and a micro approach. For the first one, they: (a) take the increase of 
agroindustrial value added (only) from Anderson and Valenzuela (2007); (b) then 
multiply that growth by the share of agroindustry in the Argentine economy, and assume 
that such product is equivalent to the impact on total GDP growth; and (c) then use a 
poverty-growth elasticity equation, estimated for the period 1998-2006.  
Several points deserve mention. First, the right approach is to use total GDP 
growth from Anderson and Valenzuela (2007). Some of the tables in that paper, as well 
as the simulations presented here (Tables 4 and 5) suggest negative effects from export 
taxes on total GDP due to the negative impact on non-agricultural GDP. Therefore, it 
cannot be assumed that agroindustry grows while the rest of the economy stays the same. 
Second, the poverty-growth elasticity estimates should be viewed with caution: they are 
estimated over an unusual period in Argentina’s economic history (that exaggerates the 
impact of growth on poverty, due to the deep crisis and recovery); show autocorrelation 
in the residuals (which invalidates the t-tests on the coefficients); and they are reduced-
form equations subject to the Lucas critique (i.e., a regression is run with a policy 
framework in place with its associated poverty and income distribution effects, and then 
the same equation is applied for a totally different policy regime). The last point here is 
that the growth effect on poverty depends on income distribution too (see, for instance, 
Ravallion 2004), and the change in policy regime (i.e. the elimination of export taxes) 
also changes the underlying income distribution. Therefore, the estimated equation 
cannot be used without adjusting for income distribution effects under these two different 
policy regimes.
23  
In turn, the micro approach: (a) assumes a price transmission from the elimination 
of export taxes to only the products in the consumption food basket (i.e. there are no 
                                                 
23 See Ravallion (2004), where he adjusts the growth elasticity of poverty taking into account possible 
nonlinearities in the relationship between such elasticity and inequality. He concludes that "growth will be 
quite a blunt instrument against poverty unless that growth comes with falling inequality".  44 
 
effects on other prices and the exchange rate, which, as shown in the present CGE paper, 
also adjust in a general equilibrium setting); and (b) assumes the transmission of higher 
prices to higher nominal incomes, but without considering possible employment effects 
of such increases in real wages. In other words, their simulations assume that nominal 
wages grow, over three years, so as to more than compensate for the price increases in the 
poverty consumption basket. But this increase in real wages, other things equal, should 
have negative employment effects, which would add to poverty. Their approach, 
however, assumes away general equilibrium effects on non-agricultural prices and 
employment that are crucial for poverty evaluation. In the simulations in the present 
paper, on the other hand, all those effects are captured in a general equilibrium model. It 
should also be noted that even with those assumptions, Nogués et al. (2007) and Nogués 
(2008) find that extreme poverty (indigence) increases, and that also non-extreme poverty 
increases on impact, and only declines after 2 years. 